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Abstract
The trade intensity index, constructed as exports plus imports divided by GDP, is the most
commonly used measure for trade openness and globalization. The index tends to indicate small
countries are more open than large countries. We show that it is the inconsistence of two implicit
assumptions in the index that leads to a size bias in the openness measurement. We use a combina-
tion of axiomatic and parametric methods to derive an unbiased, generalized index that embodies
the conventional index as a special case. Correcting the size bias leads to very different results in
relative openness measures between countries and in the estimates of the growth effect of trade
openness.
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1 Introduction 
 
The trade intensity index (TII), constructed as exports plus imports divided by 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), is the most commonly used measure for trade 
openness1 and increasingly for globalization2 as well. It has been deployed widely 
in empirical economic studies, either as a variable of primary interest3 or as a 
variable of controls. It is equally prominent outside the sphere of academic 
research, being featured regularly in business, finance and policy reports as a 
standard economic indicator. These facts underlie the important role played by 
this measurement of trade openness. 
The TII, however, often gives counterintuitive results when it comes to 
large countries. For instance, the U.S. is ranked way below Swaziland and 
Tajikistan by the index, and likewise China is ranked behind Cambodia and Laos 
(see Table 4 later). These results are not surprising if the TII is (rightly) 
interpreted as a measure of trade dependency, as large countries are expectedly 
less reliant on international trade than the small ones. However, when the index is 
used as a measure of trade openness or globalization, the results become 
counterintuitive – considering the U.S. is a core nation in the world trade system 
while Swaziland and Tajikistan are far from that, and China is also way ahead of 
its two neighbouring countries as a trading power house. In short, the TII 
‘appears’ to understate the degree of openness of large economies relative to 
small economies.  
In fact, this issue has been noticed by many and there are some attempts in 
the current literature to ‘correct the size bias’ through modifying the TII (see 
Table 1 later). A major limitation with those attempts is that, while they are based 
on the proposition of there being a size bias in the TII, how that proposition 
comes about is never made clear, and seldom a case is made to explain why a 
particular modified TII formula should be considered as the unbiased (or a less 
biased) measure. As those modifications are not based on a rigorous theoretical 
foundation, they appear to be ad hoc and thus their results are contestable. 
                                                      
1 In reviewing different measures of openness, Pritchett (1991, 1996) categorizes them into four 
general types: (i) trade to GDP ratio, (ii) measures of tariffs and non-tariff barriers, (iii) differences 
between the actual trade flows and the predicted trade flows based on some benchmark models, 
and (iv) real price distortions. 
2 For example, it is used as part of the KOF Globalization Index (Dreher 2006) and the A.T. 
Kearney/FOREIGN POLICY Globalization Index (http://www.atkearney.com). 
3 For example, Jaumotte, Lall and Papageorgiou (2008) look at the effects of trade openness on 
income distribution, Dollar and Kraay (2003) and Yankikkaya (2003) focus on its effect on 
growth, while Dollar and Kraay (2004) examine its effect on growth as well as poverty. 
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The paper aims to investigate the issue using a new approach. First of all, 
we tease out the source of the bias and thus indirectly proving4 that the TII is 
indeed biased in favour of small countries (or equivalently against large 
countries). We show that it is the inconsistence of two implicit assumptions in the 
TII that causes the size bias, which once revealed, will automatically point to the 
direction of appropriate correction. This leads to the development of a more 
generalized measure of trade openness that embodies the TII as a special case. For 
empirical work, however, a specific formula is more useful than a general 
formula. To that end, we first apply an axiomatic approach to pin down the most 
appropriate functional form for the new index and then use data to parameterize 
the function. The advantage of combining these two approaches is that the derived 
index will have a proper theoretical foundation underpinned by the axioms and, at 
the same time, be agreeable with the data. We apply both the new and the 
conventional indexes to the data and find that correcting the size bias leads to very 
difference results in relative trade openness measures between countries and, in 
relation to that, in the estimates of the growth impact of trade openness. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review some 
modifications to the TII that have been proposed in the literature. In Section 3 we 
diagnose the fundamental source of the size bias and propose a generalized trade 
openness index to rectify the problem. We then in Section 4 combine an 
axiomatic and a parametric approach to determine the most appropriate specific 
version of the formula. In Section 5 we examine how the new index affects the 
trade openness measures and ranking outcomes for different countries. The trade 
data includes exports and imports of both goods and services. We also re-examine 
in this section the growth impact of trade openness to illustrate how sensitive the 
results can be to the correction of the bias, before concluding the paper in Section 
6. 
2 The Trade Intensity Index (TII) 
2.1 The conventional formulation 
The trade intensity index is typically computed as the total-trade-to-GDP ratio: 
*
*
i i
i
i
X MTII
Y
  (1) 
4 It is a proof because if there is no bias in the TII, then we should not be able to find out the 
source of the bias. 
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where iX  and iM  are respectively the total export and total import flows of 
country i , and *iY  is its GDP. 
The rationale of dividing the total trade flows by GDP is to control for 
economic size, as large countries are likely to trade more in absolute terms. In 
other words, the TII values for countries of different sizes are supposed to be 
commensurable. Also, since both trade and GDP are measured in the same 
currency unit, there is no need to adjust for inflation in temporal analysis or for 
exchange rates in cross-country comparison. That is, the index is scale 
independent. 
An improvement to formula (1) is to use Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)-
based GDP in the denominator: 
 
i i
i
i
X MTII
Y
  (2) 
 
where iY  is PPP-based GDP for country i . 
The reason for this is that, due to the Balassa-Samuelson effect, prices of 
non-tradable goods and services in high income countries are greater than those in 
low income countries, leading to an overestimation of the former’s economic 
sizes. This improved formula has been used in a number of recent studies, 
including Alcala & Ciccone (2004) and Dollar and Kraay (2003). Still, this is not 
a universal practice; some cross-country studies continue to use formula (1).5 
While using PPP-based GDP is important on its own right, it does not remedy the 
size bias. 
On the other hand, if non-PPP-based GDP remains to be used, then it is 
even more important to correct for the size bias. This is because the share of GDP 
by the non-tradeable sector is bigger in large economies than in small economies 
in general; as such the Balassa-Samuelson effect will inflate the GDP of larger 
economies more, reinforcing the size bias. To illustrate this point, in Figure 1 we 
plot the PPP price ratio (i.e. non-PPP-based GDP divided by PPP-based GDP) 
against the log value of non-PPP-based GDP for 167 countries averaging over 
1995-2004. All figures are measured in constant 2000 US$ and the data are drawn 
from the World Development Indicators (WDI). The slope coefficient of the 
linear regression line is positive and significant at the 1% level. This confirms that 
                                                      
5 For instance Yanikkaya (2003) and Cavallo and Frankel (2008) do not indicate whether their 
trade openness measures are constructed using PPP-based GDP. However, Yanikkaya’s study uses 
a large number of trade openness measures and many of them are unrelated to the volume of trade 
flows. 
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the degree of overestimation by non-PPP-based GDP increases with the size of 
the economy. 
Figure 1. PPP price ratio versus GDP for 167 countries over 1995-2004 
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2.2 Modified indexes in the literature 
The fact that small countries tend to come out more favourably than large 
countries in openness assessments based on the TII is not a proof of size bias by 
itself. To fix the idea of size bias, consider a world of two countries, p and q, 
where 2 2p qY Y Y  , and p q p qX X M M X    ; that is, country p is twice 
the size of country q, and both countries maintain a zero trade balance.6 The TII 
will always indicate that country p is half as open as country q regardless their 
trade regimes or the volume of trade flows between them. This is what we 
consider the size bias because the only factor that leads to a smaller openness 
measure for country p is its relatively larger size. 
There have been a few attempts to correct the size bias. Table 1 lists the 
standard TII, a number of modified measures found in the literature, and the 
outcome they bring in the above two-country example. 
6 The assumption of zero trade balance is merely for simplicity and is not essential for discussion. 
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Table 1. Alternative measures of trade openness for a two-country case 
Measure Formula Openness 
measure for the 
larger country, p 
Openness measure 
for the smaller 
country, q 
Trade intensity i i
i
X M
Y

 
/X Y  2 /X Y  
Li, Morck, Yang 
& Yeung (2004) 
1
1i iN
i jj
M Y
Y Y
       
( / 2 ) (1/ 3)X Y   ( / ) (2 / 3)X Y   
Squalli & Wilson 
(2006) 
1
( )
( )
i i i i
N
i j jj
X M X M N
Y X M
            
/X Y  2 /X Y  
Ferrieri (2006) (1 )(1 )
max
i iσ π
iV
V
      
i i
i
i
X MV
Y
  , 
max max{ }, 1,2...iV V i N  , 
1
( )
i i
i N
j jj
X Mσ
X M
  , 
1
i
i N
jj
Yπ
Y
   
1/6(0.5) 0.89  1 
Graff (1999) Residual  from  
0 1i i iTII α α GDP ε  
  
 
Li et al. (2004) try to account for the size factor by incorporating a 
measure of the home country’s GDP share in the world in their index. According 
to their index, the larger country p will be more open if / 2 / 3X Y  . The 
threshold of 2/3 signifies the arbitrariness of the correction; also, the index is not 
bounded below and could become negative. Squalli & Wilson (2006) suggest a 
composite index consisting of the product of two components – the conventional 
trade intensity measure and the ratio of the country’s trade flow to the world’s 
average trade flow. The second component aims to account for the fact that small 
economies have less trade flows in absolute terms. In the above example, their 
measure however yields exactly the same result as the conventional one. Using 
the world’s average trade flows also has a drawback that the home country’s 
openness measure will be affected by the integration or disintegration of other 
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countries even if its trade flows remain the same. Ferrieri (2006) proposes to 
modify the conventional measure using a power function but fails to provide an 
explanation for this choice. The proposed measure still indicates country q is more 
open than country p, though the gap has been substantially narrowed. 
Graff (1999) takes the very different approach of using a parametric 
method. Specifically, he regresses the conventional trade openness measure 
against GDP and a constant, and then takes the residual as the trade openness 
measure. There are pros and cons of the parametric approach. While it can control 
for multiple factors, not just GDP, the results could be sensitive to the dataset and 
estimation method. Moreover, the openness measure needs to be constantly 
updated when new data become available. On the contrary, using non-parametric 
statistics like the others in Table 1 means the results are strictly reproducible7 and 
typically of more intuitive meanings. Furthermore, the estimates for any given 
period are independent of what data being available in the past or in the future. 
This paper combines these two approaches. 
The vastly different outcomes amongst the modified indexes in the above 
example reveal a fundamental issue. In providing a modification to the TII, 
researchers are suggesting that there is a benchmark of unbiased (size-wise) 
measure of openness. While there can only be a single unbiased benchmark, it is 
not clear in the previous studies why one particular modified index constitutes 
that benchmark while the others do not. To address this issue a more coherent 
theoretical framework is required. 
3 A generalized trade openness index (TOI) 
In the aforementioned example, the TII of country p can be written as a linear 
combination of an export openness measure and an import openness measure:  
p p p p
p
p p p
X M X M
TII
Y Y Y
    (3) 
The rationale of normalizing exports by GDP is that a large country may 
export more than a small country, and therefore it is necessary to adjust a 
country’s export volume with its economic size to give a more meaningful 
measure of its export openness. Likewise, the import volume needs to be 
normalized by GDP as a large country may also import more than a small country. 
In other words, in formula (3) pY  serves as respectively a proxy for country p’s 
7 In theory, the same should be true for the parametric approach; but in reality, it is often not the 
case. 
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supply capacity in its export openness measure and a proxy for its demand 
capacity in its import openness measure. Yet, this formulation of the TII 
implicitly suggests that country p is not constrained by the demand capacity of 
country q for its exports or by the supply capacity of country q for its imports. 
Here the internal inconsistency of the TII becomes very clear: if pY  is constituting 
a constraint on pX , so is qY  on qX  and thus on pM  because p qM X . Once we 
realize the problem, the correction reveals itself immediately: pX  and pM  should 
be adjusted for both pY  and qY  to yield an unbiased trade openness measure for 
country p (and likewise for country q). Indeed, this conclusion would have 
emerged straight away if one invokes the gravity model framework. As the most 
robust empirical framework for international trade, the gravity model framework 
dictates that bilateral trade between two countries is determined by, amongst other 
factors, the sizes of both countries. 
This logic extends to a multi-country world: as a country’s total trade is 
equal to the sum of all its bilateral trade with other countries, it must be 
constrained by their aggregate demand and supply capacities. Accordingly, in 
constructing a trade openness measure, the trade volume of the home country 
should be adjusted for, besides its own GDP, the GDP of the rest of the world 
(ROW). The latter includes GDPs of the countries that are currently not trading 
with the home country because otherwise it would overstate the external 
constraints confronted by closed economies. 
A general formula that serves this purpose is 
 
#
( , ) ( , )
i i
i
i i i i
X MTOI
f Y RWY f RWY Y
   (4) 
 
where #iTOI  is the generalized trade openness index for country i , 
1
1;
N
i jj j i
RWY Y   is the total PPP-based GDP measure of the ROW for country 
i , and N  is the total number of countries in the ROW. 
Here iRWY  serves as a measure of the demand constraints for the home 
country’s exports and as well as a measure of the supply constraints for its 
imports. (.,.)f  is a function of the two GDPs.  #TOI  is broken down into the 
export and import openness measures, as we do not want to presume at this stage 
that supply and demand capacities must have symmetric effects on trade flows. 
At this point, an inevitable question is: Given iRWY  is much bigger than 
iY , would the incorporation of iRWY  into 
#
iTOI  be inconsequential in practice? 
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The answer is no, except for some special cases. We demonstrate this with the 
following example, which becomes highly relevant later. 
Consider the case of (.,.)f  being a constant-elasticity-of-substitution 
(CES) function8 with equal weighting on its two augments. 
Thus, ( , ) ( , )i i i if Y RWY f RWY Y  and we have 
*
1/( ) [( ) ( ) ]
i i
i r r r
i i
X MTOI r
Y RWY
   (5) 
Table 2 shows various specific forms of *( )iTOI r  for different values of r, 
including the linear ( 1r  ), Cobb-Douglas ( 0r  ), and Leontief functions 
( r  ). 
In the case of the linear function, the denominator becomes the world 
GDP. Since the world GDP is common to all countries, using *( 1)iTOI r   to 
compare trade openness across countries is the same as comparing their gross 
trade volumes. On the other hand, in the case of the Leontief function, 
as i iRWY Y , *( ) ( ) /i i i iTOI X M Y   . That is, the conventional measure TII is 
a special and, in fact, an extreme case of the generalized index. Also, 
*ln ( 1) ln[( ) / ] ln(1 / )i i i i i jjTOI X M Y Y Y      , which closely resembles the 
formula of Li et al. (2004) except that all terms are now in log. 
Table 2. Specific forms of *( )TOI r for different elasticities of substitution 
r Elasticity of 
substitution 
1/ (1 )s r   
*( )iTOI r  Openness measure 
for  p and 
q 
1 
(Linear) 
 i i
i i
X M
Y RWY

  
2 / 3X Y  
0 
(Cobb-
Douglas) 
1 1/2
1/2 1/2( ) ( )
i i i i i
i i i i
X M X M Y
Y RWY Y RWY
     
1/22 /X Y
1  0.5 
1 1 1
1
[( ) ( ) ] 1 ( / )
i i i i
i i i i jj
X M X M
Y RWY Y Y Y  
   
3 /X Y  

(Leontief) 
0 
if 
min( , )
i i i i
i i
i i i
X M X M Y RWY
Y RWY Y
    2 /X Y  
8 It should be emphasized that the CES function is merely an example here and we do not suggest 
that it is the only appropriate function form at this stage. 
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Different values of r have different scaling effects on the absolute 
openness measures of countries p and q, but their relative openness is always 
equal to unity. This is because the two countries trade under exactly the same set 
of (mutual) constraints and therefore there is no information to differentiate their 
openness. However, this is not the case in a multi-country world. 
Figure 2 shows the relative trade openness of a small (the Netherlands), a 
medium (Canada), and a large (the U.S.) country against the value of r. The data 
are the same as those in Figure 1. In terms of PPP-based GDP, the U.S. is over 10 
times the size of Canada and over 20 times that of the Netherlands. The relative 
trade openness measure of any given pair of countries is bounded: the upper 
bound corresponds to the ratio of their TIIs, while the lower bound corresponds to 
the ratio of their trade volumes. Thereby, the ratio of the maximum to minimum 
values of the relative openness measures of two countries is exactly equal to the 
inverse of their GDP ratio. In other words, the wider the GDP gap between two 
countries, the larger the variation in their relative openness measure as the value 
of r changes. This is why the relative openness between the Netherlands and the 
U.S. has the biggest variation. 
 
Figure 2. Relative trade openness of the Netherlands, Canada, and the U.S., 1995-
2004 
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Furthermore, the relative openness measures of the three countries change 
from bigger than one to smaller than one as r increases from –2.5 to 1.5, meaning 
that there are changes in the country rankings of openness. For example, when r = 
–2.5, the Netherlands is 1.6 times more open than Canada and 4.4 times more 
open than the U.S.; when r = 1.5, the U.S. becomes 4.7 times more open than 
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Canada and 5.5 times more open than the Netherlands, implying a complete 
reverse ordering of their rankings!  
Three messages emerge from Figure 2. First, although iRWY  is much 
larger than iY , the incorporation of iRWY  into 
#
iTOI  could be consequential. 
Second, the choice of the functional form for (.,.)f  could make huge differences 
to countries’ relative trade openness measures. Third, acknowledging the need to 
incorporate external supply and demand constraints into the trade openness 
measure is only the first step towards correcting the size bias. To arrive at a 
specific measure that can be used in empirical work, further theoretical inputs are 
needed to pin down the precise form of (.,.)f . 
4 A more specific trade openness index 
4.1 An axiomatic approach 
We take formula (4) of the generalized trade openness index #TOI as the starting 
point. In what follows, we propose a number of desirable properties (i.e. axioms) 
that an appropriate trade openness index (TOI) should exhibit and then use these 
axioms to determine the appropriate form of (.,.)f . 
Axiom 1: An increase in the GDP of a country or the rest of world or both, other 
things equal, does not increase the country’s TOI value. 
This implies that 1 2 120, 0 and 0f f f   . This axiom comes from the 
basic premise that a country should not be deemed as more open if it maintains 
the same trade flows under less stringent supply or demand capacity constraints. It 
is a weaker condition than requiring the TOI value to decrease when the GDP 
increases for a given volume of trade flows. 
Axiom 2: Demand and supply capacities as measured by GDPs are of the same 
weights in the TOI. 
This axiom implies that ( , ) ( , )i i i if Y RWY f RWY Y  so that the exports and 
imports of a country are scaled by the same GDP factor. Thereby, formula (4) 
becomes 
#
( , )
i i
i
i i
X MTOI
f Y RWY
  (6) 
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This axiom arises from the quest for simplicity. As explained before, this 
implies that in a two-country world the two countries will always have the same 
degree of trade openness. 
 
 Axiom 3: The TOI is scale independent. 
 
This axiom means that the index value is independent of the currency unit 
in which trade flows and GDP are expressed. Since the numerator ( )i iX M  in 
(6) is expressed in the linear form, the axiom requires the 
denominator ( , )i if Y RWY to be of constant returns to scale: 
( , ) ( , )i i i if αY αRWY αf Y RWY . The most general functional form for (.,.)f  that 
exhibits this property while satisfies Axioms 1-2 at the same time is a CES 
function with equal weights on iY  and iRWY  (repeating formula (5)): 
 
*
1/( ) [( ) ( ) ]
i i
i r r r
i i
X MTOI r
Y RWY
   (7) 
 
Here it is useful to emphasize that the CES function is not an arbitrary 
choice here anymore; it is the only functional form for (.,.)f  that makes the TOI 
satisfy all three Axioms. 
 
Axiom 4: The TOI value of a country is independent of the number of countries in 
the rest of the world, other things equal. 
 
This axiom means that the TOI value of a country will not be affected by 
the integration or disintegration of other countries, provided that its trade flows 
and its and the ROW’s GDPs remain unchanged. This excludes the possibility of 
the TOI taking forms like * 1/( ) ( ) /{ [( ) ( / ) ] }r r ri i i i iTOI r X M N Y RWY N   , which 
measures the GDP-adjusted average trade flows between country i  and an 
average country in the ROW. 
 
Axiom 5: A country’s TOI value tends towards its TII value as the rest of the 
world’s GDP increases, other things equal. 
 
As the economic size of the ROW gets bigger, the external constraint on 
the home country’s trade flows becomes less binding and, therefore, the TII 
should become closer to the unbiased measure, i.e. lim
iRWY i i
TOI TII  . The 
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axiom implies 0r   and thus excludes the possibilities of (.,.)f  being either a 
linear or a Cobb-Douglas function: 
*
1/( ) , 0[( ) ( ) ]
i i
i r r r
i i
X MTOI r r
Y RWY
   (8) 
Although the five axioms together restrict the functional form of (.,.)f  to 
a specific CES function, for the TOI to be useful in empirical work, we need to 
further pin down the value of r. Since no theoretical considerations can help 
achieve that, we look to the data for plausible answers. 
4.2 A parametric approach 
We follow the practice of the parametric approach to look for a value for r that 
can maximize the correlation between the GDP factor and trade flows.9 The 
regression model is based on formula (8) so that the final, parameterized index 
formula will have a rigor theoretical foundation underpinned by the 
aforementioned axioms. In a sense, we are estimating a structural model. The 
following non-linear regression is estimated: 
1ln ln[( ) ( ) ]r ri i i iT r Y RWY ε    (9) 
where iT  is equal to either iX , iM  or i iX M , and iε  is the error term. 
Our dataset covers 1975 to 2004 and is divided into three periods: 1975-
84, 1985-94, and 1995-2004. The first decade covers 101 countries and the last 
one 145 countries. The data series include exports and imports of goods and 
services, and PPP-based GDP, all measured in constant 2000 US$. The data are 
sourced from the WDI. Since size matters most in inter-country comparison, we 
focus on the cross sectional aspect of the data by taking simple average over each 
decade and treat them as a pooled cross-sectional dataset. 
The results are reported in Table 3. Besides the full sample, we also 
estimate the model using data for each of the three decades. The figures in 
parentheses are heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. In all estimates the 
coefficient r is significant at the 1% level and the R-squared is larger than 0.99, 
thus we do not litter the table with those information. The results indicate that 
formula (8) is highly agreeable with the data. 
9 This approach is the same as using gravity models to measure openness in that coefficients are 
chosen to maximize the joint explanatory power of the regressors and then the residual is used as a 
measure of openness. 
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Table 3. Regressional results for the TOI formula 
Dependent variable 1975-84 1985-94 1995-2004 Full sample 
lnX -0.1457 -0.1459 -0.1572 -0.1498 
 (0.0038) (0.0034) (0.0039) (0.0022) 
     
lnM -0.1571 -0.1538 -0.1635 -0.1582 
 (0.0036) (0.003) (0.0034) (0.0019) 
     
ln(X+M) -0.1889 -0.1873 -0.2062 -0.1942 
 (0.0058) (0.0051) (0.0063) (0.0033) 
     
# of obs. 101 138 145 384 
Figures in parentheses are heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.   
 
The estimated coefficients for the export and import regressions are very 
similar across all the samples, providing support to normalizing exports and 
imports with the same denominator. All estimates for the coefficient r are 
significantly less than zero, verifying the theoretically motivated restriction that 
we imposed on its sign. The estimates are nearly identical for the first two periods 
and are only marginally different for the third period. This allows us to focus on 
just the full sample.  
The results for total trade with the full sample suggest that, rounding up to 
one decimal point, 0.2r   .10 This implies that the elasticity of substitution 
between supply and demand capacities in international trade flows is at the order 
of 0.8. We take this as our preferred value for r and set the final form of the TOI 
as: 
 
0.2 0.2 5[( ) ( ) ]
i i
i
i i
X MTOI
Y RWY  
   (10) 
 
The TOI can be interpreted as the trade volume as a share of the home 
country’s GDP factor, which is defined as a CES function of its own GDP and the 
GDP of its potential trading partners as a whole. In other words, the TOI can be 
interpreted in a way very similar to the TII despite the difference. 
A potential criticism of this formulation is in order. If a country’s GDP 
and trade stay constant while the ROW’s GDP grows, why should we think the 
country is becoming more closed? In a gravity model framework, a country that 
trades with a smaller partner (the ROW here) is considered to be more open than a 
country of the same size and trading the same amount of goods but with a larger 
partner. The same intuition appears here. 
                                                      
10 The value of 0.2 actually falls within the 95% interval of the point estimate. 
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Formula (10) can also be written as 0.2 0.2 5[( ) ( ) ]i i i i iTOI TII Y Y RWY
    . 
Here we can consider 0.2 0.2 5[( ) ( ) ]i i iY Y RWY
   as the correction to the TII and, 
thus, its inverse as a measure of the size bias. In our dataset, the average size bias 
is 0.35 (or 35%) with a standard deviation of 0.13. In other words, the extent of 
size bias is fairly severe on average but the degree of biasness varies substantially 
across countries. 
Figure 3. Correlation between the TOI and TOI*(r) 
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
‐0.6 ‐0.4 ‐0.2 0 0.2
Co
rr
el
at
io
n
be
tw
ee
n
TO
I*
(r
)a
nd
TO
I
r
Pearson
Spearman
Since 0.2r    is only a point estimate, it is natural to ask how sensitive 
the index value is with respect to the coefficient value. Figure 3 shows two 
correlation coefficients between the TOI and *( )TOI r  for 0 0.5r   . Over a 
wide neighbourhood around 0.2r    based on the scale its standard error (i.e. 
0.0033), the Pearson and the Spearman rank correlations are extremely high. This 
gives us confidence that the TOI is robust to estimation errors in r. 
Figure 2 shows that, at 0.2r    the openness gaps between the 
Netherlands, Canada and the U.S. are greatly reduced as compared to r    (i.e. 
when the index becomes the TII). For instance, the relative openness between the 
Netherlands and the U.S. shrinks from the ratio of 4.5 to 1.4, and that between 
Canada and the U.S. shrinks from 2.8 to 1. The openness gaps between some 
other countries, however, are enlarged as a result of correcting the size bias, as to 
be shown next. 
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5 Applications 
 
5.1 Comparing the TOI and TII 
 
Table 4 reports the TOI and TII values for the 145 countries over the 1995-2004 
period. The index values are normalized such that a value of 100 is assigned to the 
most open economy, which is Hong Kong for both indexes. The two normalized 
index values for any other country therefore indicate its trade openness relative to 
Hong Kong with and without rectifying the size bias. For instance, the TII 
suggests that when only their own size constraints are accounted for, Germany is 
20% as open as Hong Kong; on the contrary, the TOI suggests that when both 
internal and external size constraints are accounted for, the former is 44% as open 
as the latter.  
The Pearson correlation between the TOI and TII is equal to 0.78. Despite 
the overall positive correlation between the two indexes, the scatter plot of their 
log values in Figure 4 shows that there remains a fair amount of discrepancies 
between them. The figure also reveals that the size bias leads to more cases of 
overstatement than understatement of trade openness by the TII. This is because 
small-sized countries outnumber their large-sized counterparts in the dataset. 
Previously, Figure 2 showed that using the TOI leads to a substantial 
reduction in the openness gaps between the three sample countries. This finding, 
however, cannot be generalized to other countries. For instance, before correcting 
the size bias, Canada and Estonia are deemed as equally open with an openness 
measure equals to 24; after the correction Canada’s measure increases by more 
than 50% to 38 while Estonia’s measure decreases by 40% to 14, creating a big 
gulf between them. Since the TOI only controls for size factors, the differences in 
its values between countries would be attributed to factors unrelated to size, such 
as trade barriers, distance from potential trading partners, institutional setting and 
endowment.  
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Table 4. Normalized TOI, normalized TII, and country rankings for 145 countries, 1995-2004 
Country TOI TII
TOI 
ranking TII ranking
Change in 
ranking Country TOI TII
TOI 
ranking TII ranking
Change in 
ranking
Hong Kong, China 100 100 1 1 0 Portugal 14.97 14.79 38 49 11
Luxembourg 60.18 94.77 2 2 0 Lebanon 14.38 23.69 39 25 -14
Belgium 54.06 47.88 3 5 2 Estonia 14.35 24.24 40 24 -16
Netherlands 50.46 39.19 4 9 5 Trinidad and Tobago 14.26 24.46 41 21 -20
Ireland 46.79 52.61 5 4 -1 New Zealand 14.20 17.06 42 42 0
Germany 43.85 20.63 6 32 26 Slovak Republic 13.70 17.35 43 41 -2
United Arab Emirates 43.49 53.23 7 3 -4 Venezuela, RB 13.43 14.13 44 52 8
Canada 37.71 24.26 8 23 15 Nigeria 12.56 14.20 45 51 6
United States 36.53 8.72 9 86 77 China 12.54 4.11 46 133 87
Malaysia 36.08 34.96 10 10 0 Croatia 11.96 16.34 47 46 -1
United Kingdom 35.07 18.18 11 34 23 Greece 11.61 11.34 48 68 20
Switzerland 33.79 31.66 12 12 0 Seychelles 11.56 26.83 49 19 -30
Sweden 32.05 29.77 13 14 1 Philippines 11.51 9.91 50 79 29
France 31.02 16.33 14 47 33 Jordan 11.45 17.92 51 37 -14
Denmark 30.18 31.17 15 13 -2 Chile 11.24 11.78 52 64 12
Austria 28.54 26.63 16 20 4 Turkey 11.16 8.74 53 85 32
Norway 28.42 29.24 17 15 -2 Russian Federation 11.12 6.62 54 108 54
Korea, Rep. 27.19 17.96 18 36 18 Costa Rica 11.06 16.02 55 48 -7
Italy 26.02 13.95 19 54 35 Yemen, Rep. 10.88 18.06 56 35 -21
Japan 25.83 10.07 20 77 57 Poland 10.79 8.66 57 87 30
Macao, China 23.25 41.33 21 8 -13 Dominica 10.71 27.85 58 18 -40
Finland 21.42 22.89 22 28 6 Belize 10.61 24.35 59 22 -37
Spain 21.23 13.35 23 56 33 Mauritius 10.34 17.89 60 38 -22
Kuwait 21.00 28.38 24 16 -8 Swaziland 10.31 20.55 61 33 -28
Congo, Rep. 20.96 42.72 25 7 -18 Indonesia 10.29 7.18 62 101 39
Israel 20.79 21.92 26 31 5 Lithuania 9.91 14.30 63 50 -13
Mexico 20.77 13.20 27 57 30 Grenada 9.45 23.37 64 27 -37
Panama 20.66 33.25 28 11 -17 Gabon 9.35 17.05 65 43 -22
Saudi Arabia 18.92 16.77 29 44 15 Belarus 9.26 12.33 66 62 -4
Antigua and Barbuda 18.64 45.51 30 6 -24 Dominican Republic 9.17 12.03 67 63 -4
Australia 16.99 12.79 31 60 29 St. Vincent and the Grenadines 9.11 22.79 68 29 -39
Hungary 16.68 17.84 32 39 7 Latvia 8.71 13.79 69 55 -14
Thailand 16.45 13.05 33 59 26 Guyana 8.50 17.83 70 40 -30
Slovenia 16.42 23.54 34 26 -8 Tunisia 8.44 10.76 71 73 2
Czech Republic 16.17 16.46 35 45 10 Turkmenistan 8.23 14.00 72 53 -19
Oman 15.26 22.12 36 30 -6 Bulgaria 8.09 10.64 73 74 1
Iceland 15.25 27.94 37 17 -20 South Africa 8.04 6.47 74 115 41  
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Figure 4. TOI versus TII for 145 countries over 1995-2004 
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Figure 5. TOI ranking vs TII ranking for 145 countries over 1995-2004 
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The significant changes in relative openness between many countries 
mean that there are also substantial movements in their rankings. The country 
rankings according to the two indexes, as well as the changes in the rankings are 
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also reported in Table 4. If the change in ranking is positive, it means that the TOI 
ranks the country in concern higher than the TII does. For instance, Germany is 
ranked 32nd by the TII but 6th by the TOI, so its ranking improves by 26 places 
when the size bias has been rectified. The average change of ranking is equal to 
16.4 (against the total number of 145 countries), and the standard deviation is 15. 
The effect of the new index on country ranking is shown in Figure 5, which is a 
scatter plot of the TOI ranking against the TII ranking. The Spearman rank 
correlation between the two indexes is equal to 0.84. So the rank correlation 
between the two indexes is moderately high. 
As expected, a lot of large economies have moved up the ranking ladder as 
a result of correcting the size bias. China exhibits the largest change in ranking 
with an upward jump of 87 places to rank 46th, followed by the U.S. (up 77 to 9th), 
Japan (up 57 to 20th) and Russian Federation (up 54 to 54th). On the other hand, 
those have moved down the ladder are very small economies, including Dominica 
(down 40 to 58th), Djibouti (down 39 to 97th), St Vincent and the Grenadines 
(down 39 to 68th), and Grenada (down 37 to 64th).11 Returning to the examples in 
section 1, after correcting for the size bias, the U.S. is now ranked well ahead of 
Swaziland and Tajikistan, and China is considered much more open than 
Cambodia and Laos – as one would expect. 
 
5.2 Trade openness and growth 
 
The change in country ranking as evident above could have significant 
implications to cross country analysis of issues such as the effect of trade 
openness on growth or inequality. How the use of the TOI would affect an 
empirical outcome is obviously case dependent. As an illustration, we follow 
Dollar and Kraay (2004) (referred as DK hereafter) to examine the growth 
impacts of trade openness, but use the TOI and TII in turn to compare and 
contrast their results. This exercise only serves to illustrate the potential impact of 
correcting the size bias in empirical work. It is not meant to be an in-depth study 
of the determinants of growth. Thereby, we will draw mostly on the sensitivity of 
the results with respect to the two openness measures. 
We adopt model (2) from Table 4 of DK. The model involves regressing 
log income on its own lag, the log value of the trade openness measure, country 
fixed effects and time fixed effects. The first fixed effects capture time invariant 
country specific factors, such as geography and institutions, while the second ones 
                                                      
11 These changes in the openness ranking can be summarized crudely by the changes in rank 
correlations between the economic size and openness measures. The Spearman correlations 
between lnGDP (PPP, constant 2000$) and the openness measure increases to 0.37 with the TOI 
from 0.11 with the TII. In other words, there is a general but mild reverse ordering of openness 
rankings when the size bias is rectified. 
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capture time variant country common factors such as world commodity prices. 
Certain portion of country specific but slowly evolving factors such as 
demography and policies can be captured by lagged income. For the remaining 
omitted factors, as long as they are not correlated with both income and trade, 
they will not cause bias to the coefficient estimate for openness. DK show that 
this parsimonious model is very robust in that, adding a number of other possible 
determinants neither improves the model nor significantly affects their results on 
trade openness. The simplicity of the model allows us to focus on the differences 
that the new trade openness measure could make. 
The dataset is the same as that in section 4.2. Due to the use of first 
differencing and lag variable, it covers only 101 countries. It is, thus, a typical 
“large N and small T” panel. Following the estimation strategy of DK, the model 
is estimated in first difference to remove the country fixed effects. This means 
that in practice we are regressing the income growth rate of the 1990s (i.e. from 
1985-94 to 1995-2004) on the income growth rate of the 1980s (i.e. from 1975-84 
to 1985-94) plus the growth rate of trade openness of the 1990s.12 This is 
essentially a dynamic panel model and necessitates instrumenting the growth rates 
of lagged income and trade openness. Here the initial income, trade openness and 
trade volume in 1975-84 are used as the instruments. 
The results are presented in Table 5. We first estimate the model using 
OLS regressions. All variables are significant at the 1% level with the expected 
signs. Yet, there are noticeable quantitative differences in that the point estimate 
of the TOI coefficient is nearly 50% larger than of the TII coefficient. On the 
other hand, the coefficient on the lagged income in the TOI model is slightly 
smaller than that in the TII model. However, since trade openness could be 
endogenous, the OLS estimations may be biased. 
12 The time fixed effects become a constant term after first differencing. 
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To address the endogeneity problem, we re-estimate the model using 2SLS 
estimators (columns 3-4). All variables remain significant at the 1% level with the 
exception that the TII’s significance drops just below the 5% level (p=0.058). All 
variables retain their expected signs. Quantitatively, the use of IV estimation sees 
the coefficients on trade openness increasing. Interpreting the results 
mechanically, the TOI model suggests that a 100% increase in trade openness 
would lead to a 30% increase in income, while the TII model suggests a 17% 
increase only. This means that, after arresting endogeneity, the difference between 
the TOI and TII coefficients becomes even wider. Yet, one should also be aware 
that the 95% confidence intervals of the two coefficients overlap. 
Notwithstanding, for this dataset and model specification, removing the size bias 
reveals a higher point estimate for the effect of trade openness on income. 
The coefficient on the lagged income in the TOI model is noticeably 
smaller with the use of instruments. Lastly, results from Wooldridge’s (1995) 
over-identification test, which is robust to heteroskedasticity, suggested that the 
instruments are valid. 
In columns (5)-(6), we exclude the two most open economies – Hong 
Kong and Luxembourg – from the sample as their openness could be overstated 
Table 5 Estimation results of the effect of trade openness on income 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Estimator OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Sample Full sample Full sample Excluding Hong Kong 
and Luxembourg 
Openness measure TII TOI TII TOI TII TOI 
       
Lagged income 0.507 0.489 0.541 0.327 0.581 0.364 
 (0.081)*** (0.076)*** (0.169)*** (0.150)** (0.207)*** (0.164)** 
       
Trade openness 0.119 0.175 0.165 0.304 0.172 0.298 
 (0.047)*** (0.041)*** (0.087)* (0.089)*** (0.090)* (0.086)*** 
       
R-squared 0.432 0.465 0.426 0.401 0.418 0.420 
Over-identification test (p)   0.223 0.342 0.220 0.330 
# of obs. 101 101 101 101 99 99 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively. Figures in parentheses are 
robust standard errors. Results for the time fixed effect are omitted. 
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due to their heavy re-export activities.13 Notwithstanding, the previous results are 
found to be very robust to the exclusion of these two entrepôts. 
Overall, we observe that using the TOI as compared to the TII makes 
discernible quantitative differences not only to the results for trade openness itself 
but sometimes also to the results for other variables. On the other hand, there 
seem to be little qualitative differences. This is reasonable given the TOI is an 
improvement of the TII, not an overhaul. However, one should not attempt to 
generalize these findings to other analyses involving trade openness. The use of 
the TOI may make much bigger differences when alternative datasets, 
specifications or estimation methods are used, not to mention when different 
topics (e.g. poverty or inequality instead of growth) are considered.  
6 Conclusion 
The trade intensity index (TII) is a very basic measure of trade openness as it only 
controls for the home country’s GDP. Then why should we concern with 
modifying the index ‘at the margin’ when much more elaborative measures are 
already available? Firstly, GDP is the most important single factor in determining 
trade flows. Recall that the GDP variables can ‘explain’ over 99% of the cross 
country variation in trade flows in our dataset. Therefore ‘just’ improving the 
GDP component of the TII is still of great practical value. Secondly, although 
many sophisticated measures have been developed, the TII remains the most 
commonly used measure not only of trade openness but also increasingly of trade 
globalization. Measures derived from more elaborative processes, while may be 
more accurate per se, are typically weighted down by their complexity14 and 
sometimes lack of intuitive interpretations. In developing the TOI, we 
endeavoured to ground the modification on a solid theoretical foundation to avoid 
the ad hoc approach featured in previous studies, while at the same time to 
maintain the simplicity of the original index to maximize its chance of being 
deployed by other end users.  
The TOI has a number of merits to recommend for: (1) it exhibits a 
number of desirable properties as spelled out in the axioms; (2) it corrects for the 
size bias of the TII but maintains its simple structure; (3) it can be interpreted in a 
way very similar to the TII; (4) it ties with the very robust gravity model 
framework; (5) it is easy to compute; (6) it requires only one additional piece of 
13 Another major entrepôt, Singapore, is not on the list due to the lack of data in the WDI. 
14 For instance, Lloyd and MacLaren (2002) use the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 
computable general equilibrium model to derive measures of trade openness. 
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information, the world GDP, which is easily available;15 and (7) it is highly 
agreeable with the data. 
We demonstrated that incorporating the external size constraint can lead to 
significant changes in the relative openness measures between countries and in the 
estimated effect of trade openness on income. To the extent that trade openness 
often matters in cross country analyses, using the unbiased measure in the form of 
the TOI should help deliver more reliable results. 
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